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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, section 78-
2a-3(2)(j) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Plaintiffs' statement of issue No. 1 is a misstatement of the issue. The claim of the 
Plaintiffs is for a prescriptive easement. The facts in the Plaintiffs' own disclosures and 
statements demonstrate that the Court's ruling was correct. Plaintiffs' assertion in issue number 
1 that a land owner who uses an access roadway as a matter of right for more than 20 years may 
be a correct statement of the law under different circumstances, but not in the case at bar. 
Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that the 20 year period from 1973 when they acquired their 
property was uninterrupted for 20 years. The interruption prevents that 20 year period from being 
established, either running from 1973 or after 1987, when a documented interruption of use came 
about. The other problem with the first issue is that it has to be as a matter of right. Plaintiffs 
demonstrated no matter of right for the use of the roadway and in fact it contradicts the very 
lawsuit brought herein, claiming an adverse prescriptive easement not under claim of right. 
2. Plaintiffs assert that a closure of the road for maintenance does not constitute an 
interruption to defeat a prescriptive easement. Failing to address the issue that the prescriptive 
easement has to be adverse and known to the owner of the property being crossed that it was 
adverse, Plaintiffs presented no testimony whatsoever on any event that created the adversity 
between Peays, as the owners of the property, and the Halls; thus, the decision of Ihe Court was 
correct on that issue. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs acknowledge that the property has been closed 
off every 3 or 4 years by the Peays. 
3. The Plaintiffs failed during the course of the litigation to address the ownership 
issue now claimed to be newly discovered evidence and in fact they submitted the supposed newly 
discovered evidence, a 1992 deed from Roger Gillespie to the Peays, as part of their Rule 26(a) 
Disclosures and in their motion for new trial asserted that they did have knowledge of the deed 
but did not know of the significance of it. The deeds and the areas encompassed are matters of 
public record available prior to the initial hearing on the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
and cannot constitute newly discovered evidence that would have caused the Court to even pause 
on the issue of newly discovered evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Defendants own certain real property located in Utah County, Utah. (Record at 206-
210, 230 paragraph 1, 289 paragraphl.) The Plaintiffs own real property to the north of 
Defendants' property. (Record at 230 paragraph 2-3; 289 paragraphs 2-3.) The Plaintiffs have 
a legal access to their property which enters the Plaintiffs' property from the north via 5500 
North. (Record at 61 paragraph 7-9; 180 paragraphs 2-5; 230 paragraph 5; 287 paragraph 5.) 
The Plaintiffs have also been permitted by the Defendants to access their property from the south 
over the Defendants' property via Canyon Road. (Record at 61 paragraph 7-9; 200 paragraph 3; 
230 paragraph 4; 288 paragraph 4.) In August 2002, the Defendants installed a gate on their 
property which prevents further use of the access across the Defendants' property by the 
Plaintiffs. This case was brought by the Plaintiffs to acquire an easement across the Defendants' 
property. 
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Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter on December 2, 2002. (Record at 16.) With 
the Complaint, they brought a motion for temporary restraining order. (Record at 17.) The trial 
court denied the temporary restraining order on January 10, 2003. (Record at 33.) Plaintiffs then 
filed their Amended Complaint on April 25, 2003. (Record at 62.) 
The Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint contains six Causes of Action, including a 
Quiet Title claim to the easement, an Easement by Grant claim, an Easement by Implication 
through Grant or Reservation claim, an Easement by Necessity claim, a Trespass claim, and 
lastly, a request for a permanent injunction. (Record at 54-62). The Defendants filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff, Gashler, as the Gashler property was foreclosed and 
Gashler never appeared further in the case. 
In December 2003 the remaining parties, Defendants Peays, and Plaintiffs Halls, each filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment. (Record at 136 and 181.) The Defendants' initial Memorandum 
and Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment argue for the dismissal of 
all six causes of action contained in the Verified Amended Complaint. (Record at 212-231; 306-
307.) The Plaintiffs, however, did not address four of their six causes of action in any of their 
memoranda for or against summary judgment, and merely argued for summary judgment based 
on Easement by Prescription and Easement by Necessity. (Record at 173; 178.) At the hearing 
on the Motions for Summary Judgment, the trial court began by asking the parties the following: 
The Judge: And I'm just wondering if we have a case that is fact 
sensitive that prohibits it from being resolved by 
summary judgment. . . . Your observations, do you 
believe that, that where we are we need additional 
facts to resolve the case? 
Mr. Jeffs: I don't think so. 
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Mr. Lowry: I don't, Your Honor. I think we've briefed that also 
and I'd be happy to address that specific question. 
The Judge: All right. Well then I'll hear you each on your 
summary judgment arguments . . . . 
(Record Transcript page 3, lines 20-22, 24-25; page 4, lines 1-6.) Later in argument, Plaintiffs' 
counsel again stated that the facts were not disputed and that summary judgment could be entered. 
Mr. Lowry: I'm not going to waste my time on a summary 
judgment motion if I've got a big glumping fact 
issue sitting out here that kind of spoils the pudding. 
I didn't see that here. I brought this motion because 
I felt that was not the case. 
(Record Transcript, page 16, lines 7-11.) The parties agreed that all of the facts were before the 
court and that summary judgment could be properly granted. 
Disposition 
After the hearing on the matter, the trial court issued a ruling granting the Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' Complaint, and denying the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 347-352.) Judge Stott specifically noted: 
The Court queried counsel prior to receiving their oral argument on 
their respective positions as to whether the Court needed additional 
facts to decide the issues raised in each party's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Both counsel emphatically represented to the 
Court that the Court had sufficient facts to decide the Motions. 
After a complete review of the information provided and the 
applicable cases, the Court agrees with counsel that there are 
sufficient facts to support the Court's ruling. 
(Record at 350.) Judge Stott's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment was entered 
on June 17, 2004. (Record at 355-360.) On June 30, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a New 
Trial (Record at 362), which was denied by the trial court on September 27, 2004. (Record at 
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434.) The Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered on October 4, 2004. (Record at 
437-438.) On October 29, 2004 Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal. (Record at 445.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs cite to the findings by the Court for their statement of facts, thus acknowledging 
the findings by the Court to be undisputed. Rule 24(e) requires that citations to the record should 
be to the page of the record. The selection by the Plaintiffs citing to the findings of the Court as 
being the factual bases for their claims is contrary to the Rule 24(e) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and is essentially an acknowledgment that the findings of the Court are accurate. The 
contention of the Plaintiffs that the Peays did not own a part of the property at the time of the 
purported permission ignores the documents presented to the trial court in the formi of the survey 
record (Record at 391) which shows that the access way across the Peay property was more than 
one-half titled in the Peays from 1969 and thus their permission to utilize it was given 
appropriately. The fact that the Peays did not receive a deed to a part of the ground on which the 
access way exists until 1992, does not establish that they did not have an ownership interest in the 
property and the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate or produce evidence rebutting the rights of the 
Peays to the property. 
1. The Defendants, Robert Peay and Janice Peay [the "Peays"], purchased a piece of 
property in 1969. (Record at 206-210; 230 paragraph 1; 289 paragraphl.) 
2. At the time the Peays purchased their property, the adjacent piece of property to 
the north of the Peays' property was owned by Mr. and Mrs. J. Norman Smith [the "Smiths"]. 
(Record at 230 paragraphs 2-3; 289 paragraphs 2-3.) 
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3. On April 25, 1973, Plaintiffs, Dean Hall and Donna Hall [the "Halls"], purchased 
a portion of the Smiths' property to build a residence located at 5490 North canyon Road, Provo, 
Utah by way of a warranty deed from the Smiths. (Record at 169; 180 paragraph 1; 230 
paragraph 3; 289 paragraph 3. 
4. Donna and Dean Hall are the daughter and son-in-law of the Smiths and the Smiths' 
successors in interest to their home site. (Record at 169; 230 paragraph 3; 289 paragraphs 3.) 
5. On July 31, 2002, Plaintiff, David Gashler, purchased the Smiths' residence located 
at 5440 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah. (Record at 62 paragraph 5.) 
6. Plaintiffs' property has two methods of access. (Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 
Record at 61 paragraph 7.) The access from the north (off of 5500 North Street) is the actual 
legal access which Utah County required that the Plaintiffs acquire by easement over Provo City 
property, as a condition of the county issuing a permit for the construction of the Halls' home. 
(Record at 252-253; 272-273; 300-301.) The Plaintiffs' property can be accessed from the south 
by crossing over the Peays' property (Record at 61 paragraph 8) and can be accessed from the 
north. (Record at 61 paragraph 9.) 
7. After acquiring the property, the Halls applied for a building permit to build a 
home. Because it did not have frontage on a public street, they had to go before the Board of 
Adjustment and the Utah County Board of Adjustment required as a condition of issuing the 
building permit for the construction of their home, an easement across property owned by Provo 
City and frontage on the public road. (Record 252 & 253, Addendum "A", attached and 
highlighted.) The county did not require any easement or access way across the Peay property. 
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8. The Peays, since purchasing the property in 1969, have closed off access across 
their property several times for resurfacing and asphalting and to block access. (Affidavit of 
Robert Peay. (Record at 204, paragraph 1.) This was acknowledged by the Plaintiffs in their 
own affidavits and the representation of their counsel at the argument of the cross Motions for 
Summary Judgement. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that they ever disputed the closing of the 
access way by the Defendants. (Record Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8; 
190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 paragraphs 8-11; Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 286 paragraphs 8-11.) 
In 1987, the resurfacing and asphalting closed the road, and all access to the Plaintiffs' property 
from the south, for three days. (Record at 190.) Plaintiffs admitted the three-day closure in 
1987. (Record at 286 paragraph 10.) Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment cited such closure. (Record at 229 paragraph 10.) The trial Court received 
photographs demonstrating the closure of the road. (Record at 188.) 
9. Plaintiffs, in their affidavits and memoranda and in their oral argument on the 
hearing of the cross Motions for Summary Judgment have acknowledged the closures in their 
memorandum opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record at 178, paragraph 9; Record at 284, last paragraph; Transcript page 6:4-9.) 
The Defendants provided evidence that they closed off access to their property several times, not 
only for resurfacing and asphalting, but also because the Defendants knew that any prescriptive 
easements could be prevented from arising by closing off access. (Record at 203-204; 200 
paragraph 6.) 
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10. Plaintiffs Halls and their predecessors in interest have been allowed to utilize the 
access across the Peays' property from 1973 until August, 2002, when a gate was installed by the 
Peays. (Record at 179 paragraph 5.) 
11. Prior to the installation of the gate in August, 2002, no one was prevented from 
using the road, except for the times when the road was re-asphalted or when slurry was applied 
every three to four years. (Record at 178-179 paragraph 9.) 
12. In 1969, the Peays gave Norman Smith and his family permission to cross the front 
part of the Defendants' property so that Norman Smith and his family could have a more 
convenient access to their property than their legal access. The Peays initially allowed Mr. Smith 
this access because of his need to park a school bus on his property. (Record at 200 paragraph 3; 
230 paragraph 4; 288 paragraph 4.) 
13. After purchasing a portion of the Norman Smith property in 1973, the Plaintiffs 
never established an event or point in time where the permissive use became adverse. (Record 
at 266; 297; Greeny. Stansfield. 886 P.2d 117 (Utah 1994); Savage v. Nielson, 197 P.2d 117, 
124 (Utah 1948); Luntv. Kitchens. 260 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1953). 
14. This permissive family use was ended when Mr. Gashler purchased the property 
in August, 2002 and Mr. Peay put up a gate to prevent access. (Record at 179 paragraph 9.) 
15. There were several interruptions of use of the road by the Defendants. Both parties 
acknowledge that on numerous occasions the Defendants would shut off access as represented by 
the photographs showing the ropes and barricades, see Exhibit "B" to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Record at 188.) During those times, the Defendants would re-asphalt and 
apply slurry to the road in an effort to maintain it and make it available for use. When the Peays 
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shut off access to the road during repairs, there were never any objections voiced by the Smiths 
or the Halls. 
16. There exists no issue of unity of title. (Record at 203 paragraph 5.) 
17. The entire roadway in question is on the property owned by the Peays. (Record at 
179 paragraph 4.) 
18. Plaintiffs had knowledge of the 1992 deed from Roger and Janie Gillespie to the 
Peays at the time of filing their Initial Disclosures and attached a copy to it. (Record at 395-413, 
specifically Record at 405.) 
19. Plaintiffs, with due diligence, could have discovered the property covered by the 
Gillespie deed through survey or other means. (Record at 438). In fact, the Plaintiffs did survey 
the area and attached a copy to their Motion for New Trial. (Record at 368.) 
20. If found to be material, Plaintiffs could have presented such information to the 
Court at the time of the hearing of this matter on the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(Record at 438.) 
21. Plaintiffs have failed to establish newly discovered evidence which could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the hearing on the Motions for 
Summary Judgment. (Record at 437.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Plaintiffs raise three issues on their appeal. In the first issue raised by Plaintiffs, they 
claim that the court erred by holding that the Plaintiffs' use of the access was permissive. The 
Plaintiffs claim that this holding is contrary to law because the Defendants only gave permission 
to "Norman Smith and his family", and did not personally give permission to the Halls. The 
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Plaintiffs' argument fails for two reasons. First, the Halls are part of the Norman Smith family 
and were given permission to use the access, just like the other members of the Norman Smith 
family. Second, permission need not be given personally, and there is no law cited by the 
Plaintiffs to suggest otherwise. Third, contrary to the Plaintiffs' assertions, permission to use the 
Defendants' property for access need not be given "by express agreement." 
The second issue raised by the Plaintiffs is that the trial court erred by holding that the 
admitted periodic, several-day-long closures of the road by the Defendants effectively interrupted 
the twenty years of uninterrupted and continuous adverse use needed to establish a prescriptive 
easement. This argument must fail because it is in direct opposition to prescriptive easement law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained "under the well established rule, the use, in order that it 
may ripen into a prescriptive title, must, in any case, not only be adverse and continuous, and 
under claim of right for a period 20 years, but it must be uninterrupted throughout that period." 
Morris v. Blunt, 161 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916); see also Jensen v. Gerrard. 39 P.2d 1070 
(Utah 1935). Even if the Plaintiffs' use of the road was not permissive, it was, by their own 
admission, interrupted regularly. (Record Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 
8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 paragraphs 8-11; 286 paragraphs 8-11.) 
The third issue raised on appeal is that the court abused its discretion by not granting a 
new trial based on evidence, not newly discovered, but rather, newly understood. (Record at 364 
paragraph 3.) The fact is that the Plaintiffs were fully aware of the evidence they claim is new 
from the inception of this case. In fact, the Plaintiffs themselves included the new evidence in 
their Initial Rule 26(a) Disclosures to the Defendants. (Record at 395-413, specifically 405.) Even 
if the Plaintiffs did not have the evidence in their possession since the inception of this case or 
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were not aware of the legal significance of the evidence, if any, the fact remains that the Plaintiffs 
could have found the evidence with due diligence or could have understood the legal significance 
of it, if any. This fact precludes the granting of a new trial. Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs cite to Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 92 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), as a two-step process. 
The first being a party claiming a prescriptive easement must prove that its use of another's land 
results in a continuous and adverse use under a claim of right for a period of 20 years. Plaintiffs 
presented no evidence of a claim of right to that access for the 20 year period, nor did they 
present evidence that showed it was continuous and uninterrupted. Because they have failed to 
show continuous use without interruption it can not be presumed to have been adverse and thus 
their claim fails. Plaintiffs further cite that the second issue is that the owner must show the 
servient estate has the burden to establish the use was initially permissive. The Court's finding 
on that fact was the testimony of Robert Peay both on deposition and on affidavit (Record at 236, 
paragraph 1; Record at 241, paragraph 3; Record at 238, paragraph 4) and the trial court was 
never presented with any rebutting testimony or evidence. Plaintiffs assert that the Court focused 
on the second prong of the Valcarce formula but they ignore the fact that the Court specifically 
made findings and evidence that the use had not been continuous and had been interrupted every 
3 to 4 years by the Plaintiffs' own admissions. The Court did not just focus on the second prong 
but examined the interruption issue, the adverse issue, and the issue of permission. The Court 
found that it was undisputed that the initial use of the road was permissive. Plaintiffs focus on 
the testimony that Mr. Peay had never had an agreement with the Halls regarding the road, but 
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they failed to demonstrate any event that established an adverse use and put Peays on notice of 
a claim of adverse use. 
The facts of this case have never been disputed by the Plaintiffs. At the hearing on 
summary judgment, counsel agreed that the facts are not at issue and that summary judgment 
could be entered on motion by the trial court. (Record, Transcript, page 3, lines 20-22, 24-25, 
page 4, lines 1-6.) After the summary judgment hearing was held, the trial court agreed that the 
facts were not at issue and that summary judgment could be granted. (Record at 350.) On 
appeal, the Plaintiffs do not dispute the facts, including the specific facts relevant to the issues 
presented by the Plaintiffs on appeal. For example, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that permission 
was given to Norman Smith and his family to use the road. (Appellants' Brief, page 4.) Further, 
the Plaintiffs do not dispute that the road was periodically closed off for days at a time during the 
twenty year period needed to establish a prescriptive easement. (Appellants' Brief, page 3.) 
Finally, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were in possession of the purported "new evidence" 
since the inception of this case. (Appellants' Brief, page 14.) The trial court applied these and 
the other material undisputed facts to the long-standing Utah easement law and correctly granted 
summary judgment in the Defendants' favor. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT AN ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
A* Permission to Use a Road Need Not Be Given Formally or by Agreement in 
Order to Prevent a Prescriptive Easement from Arising. 
The Plaintiffs' main argument relating to the first Issue on appeal is not new. The same 
argument was also made to the trial court, which correctly rejected it. Plaintiffs argue that in 
order to give permission to a family to use an access, one must approach each and every member 
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of that family and directly give that person express formal permission. The Plainliffs provide no 
law to support this argument. The Plaintiffs make a related point that the Defendants never had 
"an agreement with the Halls regarding the road." (Appellants' Brief pg. 7.) Again, however, 
the Plaintiffs provide no law to support the argument that the permission to use a road must be 
by express agreement. In fact, the giving of permission, by its very nature, need not be a two 
party agreement, rather, it is a voluntary accommodation by one party to another. 
Nowhere in any cited law is there a requirement that permission must be formally or 
expressly given to specific members of a group. The fact is that the Defendants gave permission 
not just to Norman Smith, but Norman Smith and his family to use the Defendant's property, not 
merely to drive and park a school bus, but to access their own properties. This is undisputed. 
This permission may be properly characterized as neighborly accommodation. Neighborly 
accommodation makes the Plaintiffs' use of the Defendants' road permissive. The Utah Supreme 
Court explained: 
An antagonistic or adverse use of a way cannot spring from a 
permissive use. A prescriptive title must be acquired adversely.lt 
cannot be adverse when it rests upon a license or mere neighborly 
accommodation. 
Savage v.Nielson , 197 P.2d 117, 123 (Utah 1948 (emphasis added)). "Neighborly 
accommodations" do not require formal talks. They do not require that two or more parties enter 
into an agreement. Neighborly accommodations are routinely based merely on neighbor A's 
unspoken allowance of neighbor B's use of A's land. 
The nature of permission in the context of an easement is clear from the court's holding 
in Savage v. Nielson, in which the court explained that 
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If the use is accompanied by any recognition in express terms or by 
implication of the right of the landowner to stop such use now or at 
some time in the future, the use is not adverse. 
Savage at 35 (Emphasis added). The facts of the case at bar show that the Defendants not only 
implied a right to stop the Plaintiffs' use, but in fact, did stop the Plaintiffs' use on numerous 
occasions throughout the purported twenty year period needed for a prescriptive easement to arise. 
(Record Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 
paragraphs 8-11; 286 paragraphs 8-11.) Consequently, the Plaintiffs' use of the road cannot be 
adverse. The rationale of the holding in Savage is confirmed by the holding in Thompson v. 
Schuh, 593 P.2d 1138 (Or. 1979). In Thompson, the court explained that because such denials 
of use would be legally actionable if an established easement did in fact exist, such denials of use 
are sufficient to interrupt any claim of open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of the 
Defendants' property for a period of 20 years. The Plaintiffs never complained or raised any 
objections to these periodic, several-day-long denials of access. (Record at 283-284.) Further, 
the Defendants never asked permission of the Plaintiffs to shut off access. (Record at 283.) The 
denials of use, and the fact that both parties recognized the Defendants' authority to deny use 
provide undisputed factual bases for the Court's summary judgment ruling. 
The Plaintiffs also cite to Green v. Stansfield. 886 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah App. 1994) for 
the proposition that "the fact that a use was originally permissive does not preclude a later finding 
of adverse use." The Plaintiffs, however, fail to cite the further requirement in Green v. 
Stansfield, which is that "it is incumbent on the licensee to offer proof establishing the point at 
which use became adverse." Id. The Plaintiffs have never established a point at which the 
permissive use, admittedly given to Norman Smith and his family, became adverse to Norman 
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Smith's successors in interest, the Plaintiffs. Without evidence of such an event, the permissive 
use was never changed to adverse use, and consequently, the Plaintiffs' claims fail. Therefore, 
the Plaintiffs' use of Green v. Stansfield provides no support for its appeal. 
The Plaintiffs' reliance on State v. Hawkins by their own quote is not applicable to this 
case because they quote the court saying a license allows occupation of property only so far as is 
necessary to do the license and act no further. It deals specifically with a special license to use 
the land and not to a prescriptive easement. It also fails to point out that the ruling in Hawkins 
says that if a person uses it different than the license was given that they become a trespasser. 
Plaintiffs have made no claim that they use it different than the permissive use given by Mr. Peay. 
The fact that a permissive use does not preclude a later finding of adverse use ignores the 
requirement that some event or circumstance must be demonstrated to illustrate when the 
permissive use became adverse. The Plaintiffs also ignore the fact that at the time that the 
permissive use was given, Mrs. Hall was a part of the Norman and Myrle Smith family, and 
therefore, the permissive use was not passed by reason of the passage of title, but by reason of 
the permission given to the Smith family. Citations set forth therein as to a license are not 
applicable to the issues before the Court in this case. Halls never cite any circumstance or 
argument or disagreement that would have created an adverse use by them converting it from a 
permissive use to an adverse use. Their own evidence refutes such adverse use. Even if such 
event had occurred, Plaintiffs would still fail because of the admitted interruption in use. If 
measured from Halls' acquisition of title in 1973 — it was 14 years until the blocking of access 
in 1987 and only 15 years from the 1987 blocking until the suit was filed precluding the 20 year 
period of uninterrupted adverse use. 
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While the specifics of the 1987 closure of the road were given to the Court, the Plaintiffs 
themselves admitted that every 3 to 4 years the access way had been closed off for maintenance. 
Further as pointed out to the trial court, Brigham Young University closes all of their roads one 
day a year and used the time to resurface or slurry coat the roads, just as in this case. 
In their Appellants' Brief, the Plaintiffs cite to State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah App. 
1998), two Idaho cases, State v. Camp, 8 P.3d 657, 662 (Idaho App. 2000) and Rowan v. Riley, 
72 P.3rd 889, 896 (Idaho 2003), and a Colorado case, Booker v. Cherokee Water District, 651 
P.2nd 452, 453 (Colo App. 1982). None of the cases are applicable. First, all the principles and 
holdings in Hawkins, Camp, Rowan and Booker involve licenses, not easements. "An easement 
is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the 
general use of the property by the owner." Rowan at 896. In contrast, a "license is a permissive 
use of land by which the owner allows another to come onto his land for a specific purpose." Id. 
There are further differences as well, as shown below, which make the Plaintiffs' discussion of 
these cases irrelevant to the issues in this appeal. 
State v. Hawkins is a criminal burglary case arising out of an eviction. It has no facts 
applicable to this case. In Hawkins, a tenant abandoned a lease, was contacted by the landlord 
and instructed to retrieve the personal property left at the leased premises. The tenant returned 
several months later and sometime between 4:00 and 6:30 AM, kicked in the door of the leased 
premises, and took various personal property not belonging to the tenant. After being charged 
with burglary, the tenant claimed that he had been given express authority to return and retrieve 
his property, which authority, the tenant claimed, had never been revoked. The court simply 
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explained that the tenant did not have the authority to kick in the door at that time in the morning 
because: 
A license allows occupation of a property only so far as it is 
necessary to do the licensed act, and no further. A license must be 
exercised only in the manner and for the special purpose for which 
consent was given; if exercised in any other manner, or if the 
permission given is exceeded, the licensee becomes a trespasser. A 
license cannot justify acts unless they are within its terms, and those 
terms will not be strained beyond a fair and reasonable 
interpretation. 
Hawkins at 971. Nothing in this holding applies to the case at bar. First, Hawkins did not 
involve an easement, but rather, a license. The tenant had no right to use the land, only a 
purported right to enter the land for a specific purpose. Second, the only question inHawkins is 
whether the tenant went beyond the license granted. No such question is at issue in the case at 
bar. The question in the case at bar is not whether a party went beyond an express license 
granted, but rather, whether the permission to use a road must be granted expressly and formally, 
and to each and every member of a family. Nothing in Hawkins addresses this issue. 
The Plaintiffs cite to similarly inapplicable holdings in Camp, Rowan and Booker. The 
Plaintiffs cite Booker for the proposition that "a license is a personal privilege to do some act 
upon the land of another." (Appellants' Brief, page 8.) This holding has no effect on the case 
at bar. Again, this is a case about a license, not an easement. Further, even if the discussion of 
a license was applicable, the Booker court explained that "a bare license is revocable," and it is 
clear from the evidence in this case that the permission to use the access was revoked by the 
Defendants. Booker at 453. Nothing in Booker stands for the proposition that permission to use 
an access as an easement must be granted formally to each and every member of a family. 
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The Plaintiffs cite Camp and Rowan for the proposition that an express license between 
two specific parties expires upon the death of one of the parties. This principle, however, 
provides no support for the Plaintiffs' appeal. First, this is a principle specific to licenses, not 
easements. Rowan specifically notes that this is one of the differences between licenses and 
easements. Rowan at 896. Second, like theHawkins case, Camp and Rowan involve parties who 
went beyond the license granted. The question in the case at bar is not whether a party went 
beyond an express license granted, but rather, whether permission to use an access as a permissive 
easement must be granted expressly and formally, and to each and every member of a family. 
Nothing in Camp or Rowan addresses this issue. 
Because the Plaintiffs provide no support for the argument that permission to use an access 
as an easement must be formally and expressly given, and because they provide no support for 
the argument that the permission to use an access or an easement must be given "by agreement," 
the first Issue on appeal should be rejected. The cases cited by the Plaintiffs do not support the 
Plaintiffs' arguments, and contain facts which are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case 
at bar. 
B. The Plaintiffs Were Permitted to Use the Defendants' Property as an Access 
as a Neighborly Accommodation. 
The Plaintiffs' secondary argument on the first Issue on appeal is that the Halls should not 
be considered part of Norman Smith's family. That argument fails, first of all, because it is 
simply untrue. The Halls are the daughter and son-in-law of Mr. And Mrs. Norman Smith. 
There is no reasonable basis to limit "family" to only some members of the family. Second, even 
if the Halls consider themselves to no longer be a part of the Norman Smith family, the fact 
remains that the Defendants, the Peays, considered them to be a part of the Norman Smith family, 
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and granted them permission to use the road. Third, the "family" argument fails because it is not 
relevant. Even if the Plaintiffs were not part of the Norman Smith "family", and even if the 
Defendants were mistaken in that regard, the fact remains that the Defendants gave the Plaintiffs' 
predecessors in title permission to use the access. The reasons for the giving of the permission 
are not important, rather, the important fact is that permission was given. 
Again, permission need not be given by agreement and it need not be formalized. 
Permission to use a road, as stated above, can arise from an unspoken "neighborly 
accommodation" accompanied by "any recognition," express or implied, of the right of the land 
owner to stop such use. See, Savage at 35. The Defendants gave permission to the Plaintiffs, 
regardless of their relationship to Norman Smith, and such permission precludes a prescriptive 
easement from arising. 
Lastly, even if the trial court made an error regarding the permission granted by the 
Defendants to the Plaintiffs, any such an error would be harmless because the fact remains that 
no prescriptive easement can arise when use has been interrupted before the twenty (20) year 
prescriptive period runs. The undisputed facts show that the Plaintiffs' use of the road was 
repeatedly and completely interrupted, thereby preventing a prescriptive easement from arising, 
regardless of the issue of permissive use. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS' PERMISSIVE USE WAS INTERRUPTED REGULARLY. 
The Plaintiffs' argument relating to the second Issue on appeal, like the main argument on 
the first Issue, is not new, and was similarly rejected by the Court. The Plaintiffs acknowledge 
that the Defendants periodically and for several days at a time, denied the Plaintiffs the use of the 
access. (Appellants' Brief, pages 10-11, Record at 356.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that these 
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complete closures do not qualify as interruptions sufficient to effectively interrupt the twenty (20) 
year prescriptive use period. The Plaintiffs again provide no support for this argument. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly explained "under the well established rule, the use, 
in order that it may ripen into a prescriptive title, must, in any case, not only be adverse and 
continuous, and under claim of right for a period 20 years, but it must be uninterrupted 
throughout that period." Morris v. Blunt. 161 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916)(emphasis added). 
As a consequence of, and in reliance of this rule of law, Brigham Young University makes it a 
regular policy to barricade and deny access to its roads each Labor Day. This denial of access 
for one day effectively interrupts any claim of continuous use by any party, and thereby insures 
that no one will obtain a prescriptive easement over Brigham Young University's property and 
uses the time to resurface or slurry coat the roads, just as in this case and that is what constitutes 
their prevention of prescriptive easements. The Defendants have done the exact same thing here, 
and it is equally effective. The Defendants have regularly placed barricades and ropes, asphalted 
and slurry coated the property, and prevented the Plaintiffs and other neighbors to the north from 
any access over their property 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants only closed the access for the purpose of 
maintenance, and therefore, the interruptions are not effective. First, this argument fails because 
it is not true. The Affidavit of Robert Peay clearly states that the access was closed for two 
reasons: maintenance and to prevent any prescriptive easement from arising. (Record at 203-204; 
200.) These facts were never disputed with any evidence. Second, this argument fails because 
whether the road was closed for maintenance is irrelevant. The fact remains that the access was 
closed off and all use was prevented because of these closures. Plaintiffs could not and did not 
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use the access during these closures The fact that the Defendants exercised then right to close 
the road is the exact sort of "recognition of the right of the landowner to stop such use" 
described by the court in Savage v Nielson The exercise of this right effectively prevents a 
prescriptive easement from arising 
Moreover, it was not merely the Defendants that recognized this right, but the Plaintiffs 
also Plaintiffs, if they truly had a right to use the property, could have brought an action against 
the Defendants to prevent the periodic closures, but never did so, and in fact, the Plaintiffs never 
objected to any of the Defendants' closures; and therefore, under the rationale of Savage v 
Nielson and Thompson v Shuh, cited m section IA of this Brief, these closures are sufficient to 
interrupt the twenty (20) year prescriptive use period 
Plaintiffs purport to support their argument that the court made an error by citing to Am 
Jur The specific Am Jur case cited by the Plaintiffs is a West Virginia case stating that "an 
occasional detour along a portion of a way will not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period 
as to the original way, Walls v Denoon "sic", 550 S E 2nd 653, 657 (W VA 2001) " 
25 Am Jur 2D Easements and Licenses § 69 (1996) The Walls v Denoone, however, is not 
applicable to the facts m the case at bar 
Walls v Denoone involves the abandonment of an easement The party arguing that an 
easement had been abandoned argued that because the easement holder (Mr Weaver) had driven 
on the easement until he reached a fence, and then proceeded through the fence on foot, that the 
easement had been abandoned In rejecting this argument the court noted that "the mere fact that 
the holder of an easement has made a detour around some obstruction in a right ol way does not 
extinguish or effect the existence of the right of way " Walls at 657 This holding, however, 
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does not apply to the case at bar. In the Denoone case, the easement holder was not prevented 
from using the easement, despite the gate. The court explained that "clearly, the right of way was 
used for pedestrian property and vehicular traffic after the gate was erected. The only dispute is 
whether there was vehicular passage over the final few feet of the easement into what became the 
Denoon property, and the evidence on that point is conflicting." Denoone at 658. 
In the case at bar, however, no such facts or questions exist. First, it is undisputed that 
the Plaintiffs were prevented from using the Defendants' property for access for days at a time, 
for either vehicular, pedestrian or other type of traffic. Second, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs 
were prevented from using the entire access over the Defendants' land, and not merely a portion. 
Third, under long-standing Utah law, in order for a prescriptive easement to arise, use must "not 
only be adverse and continuous, and under claim of right for a period of 20 years, but it must be 
uninterrupted throughout that period." Morris v. Blunt. 161 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916); see 
also Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1935). In Morris v. Blunt, the Supreme Court held 
that because the defendant had plowed the road and from time to time placed rocks in the road and 
otherwise interrupted the plaintiffs use throughout the 20 year period, the court concluded that 
"the use was not uninterrupted, and that no right by prescription could arise under these 
circumstances." Icf In the case at bar, the Defendants regularly placed barricades and ropes, 
asphalted and slurry coated his property, and prevented the Plaintiffs and other neighbors to the 
north from accessing their property over the Defendants' property. (Record Transcript page 6 
lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 paragraphs 8-11; 286 
paragraphs 8-11.) The Supreme Court in Griffiths v. Archibald reemphasized the necessity of 
continuous and uninterrupted use. The court stated that "if the use is against the owner's will and 
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he interrupts or requires the user to constantly fight or scramble therefore, then the use is not 
peaceful and cannot create a prescriptive easement." Griffiths v. Archibald, 272 P.2d 586, 588 
(Utah 1954); see also Thompson v. Griffiths, 344 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1959). It is clear under 
Utah law that no prescriptive easement can arise out of the facts in our case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A NEW 
TRIAL WAS NOT WARRANTED. 
The third Issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that the purported 
"new" evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs after summary judgment had been granted warranted 
a new trial. 
A. The Plaintiffs Failed to Meet the Requirements to Warrant a New Trial. 
There are numerous cases by the Utah Appellate Courts defining the burden of the party 
filing a Motion for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 59. Only a 
few of which will be cited herein. In Universal Inv. Co. v. Carpets, Inc.. 16 Utah 2d Reports 
336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965) the court said: 
In order to warrant granting such a motion the moving party must meet these 
requirements: there must be material, competent evidence which is in fact "newly 
discovered"; which by due diligence could not have been discovered and produced 
at trial; and it must not be merely cumulative or incidental, but it must be of 
sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there would 
have been a different result. (Emphasis added). 
In 1982, in the case of Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, the Supreme Court said: 
To be entitled to . . . a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the 
defendant must show that: (a) there is material, competent evidence which is in fact 
newly discovered; (b) by due diligence the evidence could not have been 
discovered and produced at trial; and (c) the evidence must not be merely 
cumulative or incidental but must be of sufficient substance that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that with it there would have been a different result. 
Gregerson v. Jensen, Utah, 617 P.2d 369, 372 (1980). The difficulty with the 
defendant's contention is that it has failed to show that it exercised due diligence 
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1o discover the alleged new evidence which it arguably had in its possession the 
entire time. (Emphasis added). 
The court has confirmed the elements required of the moving party in Promax Development Corp. 
v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Cert, denying 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997)) 
wherein the court stated: 
To succeed on such a motion, a party must establish: (1) the existence of newly 
discovered evidence which is material and competent; (2) that by due diligence the 
evidence could not have been discovered and produced before trial; and (3) that the 
evidence is not merely cumulative or incidental, but is substantial enough that with 
the evidence there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result. (Emphasis 
added). 
B. The Plaintiffs Were in Possession of the Purported "New" Evidence from the 
Commencement of Litigation. 
The Plaintiffs claim that the "new" evidence has been newly discovered and therefore 
meets the first requirement set forth above. This argument fails for several reasons, first, because 
the purported "new" evidence is a 1992 deed which the Plaintiffs had in their possession and 
clearly knew about from the outset of litigation. It is not new evidence in any sense of the word. 
In fact, the Plaintiffs included this 1992 deed in their Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures. (Record at 
395-413, specifically 405, copy attached as Addendum "B".) The Plaintiffs claim that this should 
be considered new evidence because it was not understood until after summary judgment was 
granted. As the Plaintiffs' affidavit says, she was "unaware" of its supposed legal significance. 
(Record at 364.) The Plaintiffs' failure to perceive or understand the supposed legal significance 
of the 1992 deed until after summary judgment does not make the evidence new, and certainly 
does not warrant a new trial. The trial court's holding that the 1992 deed was not new evidence 
was not error and should not be reversed. 
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Next, because the Plaintiffs cannot reasonably argue that the 1992 deed is new, they imply 
that they could not, with due diligence, discover the significance and meaning of the 1992 deed. 
(Appellants' Brief, pages 13-14.) First, the relevant determination is not whether the Plaintiffs 
could, with due diligence, discover the significance or meaning of the 1992 deed. Instead, the 
relevant determination is whether the Plaintiffs could, with due diligence, discover the evidence 
itself- that is, the 1992 deed. Promax Development Corp. and the other cases cited above require 
that it be shown "that by due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered." (Emphasis 
added). On this point, the fact that not only could the 1992 deed be discovered, but in fact, was 
discovered and disclosed by the Plaintiffs destroys the Plaintiffs' claims for a new trial. 
Second, even if the relevant determination was whether the significance or meaning of the 
1992 deed could be discovered, the Plaintiffs' argument should still be rejected. It is clear, as the 
trial court held, that the supposed legal significance of the evidence could, with due diligence, 
easily have been found by merely conducting a survey or other means. The Plaintiffs never 
provide any reason why they could not conduct a survey, as the trial court suggested. Instead, 
the Plaintiffs simply blame the Defendants for supposedly misleading them. Such excuses have 
no bearing on whether the Plaintiffs used due diligence, and therefore, such excuses are 
insufficient to allow a new trial in this matter. In fact, the Plaintiffs did have the area surveyed 
and attached a copy of the survey to their Motion for New Trial after the Court's grant of 
Summary Judgment to Defendants. (Record at 367-368.) 
Third, the Plaintiffs' excuses for not exercising due diligence are not legitimate. The 
Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants misled them with a June 29, 2004 survey. (Appellants' Brief 
page 14.) However, the June 29, 2004 survey could not possibly have misled the Plaintiffs into 
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not performing due diligence prior to the summary judgment for the simple fact that the June 29, 
2004 survey came into existence more than a month after the Court's memorandum decision 
granting Summary Judgment to Defendants on May 24, 2004. (Record at 352.) Further, the 
Plaintiffs claimed to support their allegation that the Defendants misled them by submitting their 
own survey to the trial court. Regardless of which survey is accurate, the fact that the Plaintiffs 
submitted this survey is proof that the Plaintiffs were capable of performing the due diligence 
required to prepare for summary judgment. It should be remembered that the Plaintiffs had the 
opportunity to obtain such a survey prior to summary judgment, chose not to do so, and at the 
summary judgment hearing confirmed this decision by insisting to the Court that all the relevant 
facts were before the Court and that a decision on summary judgment could be made. (Record, 
Transcript, page 3, lines 20-22, 24-25, page 4, lines l-6)(Record at 350.) 
On newly discovered evidence, the Plaintiffs ignore their own statement of the decisions 
on what defines newly discovered evidence. While they acknowledge they had the deed, they 
assert that the Halls did not have the actual surveyed property until after the grant of summary 
judgment. That assertion ignores that under due diligence they could have surveyed it and they 
certainly had the deed in their possession because they attached it to their Rule 26(a) Disclosures. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Halls did not know the location of the deeded property in relation to the 
access road. That is exactly what they are required to have discovered, because it was all 
available and the trial judge was correct in ruling that this was not newly discovered evidence. 
It is inconceivable that Plaintiffs would assert they did not know until after the summary judgment 
that the Peays did not own the access roadway to which they claim a prescriptive easement. If 
that is the case, then there would be no reason for Plaintiffs to have attached the 1992 Gillespie 
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deed to their Rule 26(a) Disclosures. In the motion for new trial, Plaintiffs claim that they merely 
did not know the significance of the deed. That is a reflection on their own lack of due diligence 
and cannot constitute newly discovered evidence. Aside from that, the access in which Plaintiffs 
claim a prescriptive easement was in large part encompassed within the original 1969 deed by 
Olive Hauter to the Peays, and thus, the access was on the Peays' property and Peays had owned 
it since 1969. Peays had full right to give or deny permission to go on that access way since 
1969. 
The claim of Halls that they had no reason to suspect that the access was not completely 
acquired by the Peays until 1992, is a verification of the Plaintiffs' lack of due diligence and 
failure to discover evidence which was readily available at all times by the simple expedient of 
having it surveyed, as they did after the summary judgment was granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The material facts of this case remain undisputed. The Plaintiffs failed to establish a 
prescriptive easement over the Defendants' land because the Plaintiffs' use of the Defendants' 
property was permissive. (Record at 200 paragraph 3; 230 paragraph 4; 288 paragraph 4.) The 
Plaintiffs' attempt to create new law requiring that permission be given formally and "by 
agreement" has no basis in Utah law or any other state's law, and such a requirement would 
destroy the very nature of neighborly accommodation. 
The trial court's decision is likewise not error for a second reason — the Plaintiffs' use 
of the Defendants' access, even if not permissive, was not continuous and uninterrupted for the 
required 20 years. The fact remains undisputed that the Defendants interrupted the Plaintiffs' use 
of the access on numerous occasions. This fact is actually admitted by the Plaintiffs. (Record 
27 
Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 
paragraphs 8-11; 286 paragraphs 8-11.) The Plaintiffs' argue that these several-day-long 
interruptions were insufficient to effectively interrupt the Plaintiffs' use. The Plaintiffs, however, 
fail to support this argument with any relevant law. 
Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that a new trial was warranted on the basis that new evidence 
had been found. The fact is, however, that no new evidence was found, but rather, its supposed 
importance was newly understood. (Record at 364.) The undisputed facts show that the Plaintiffs 
were in possession of the "new" evidence from the commencement of litigation and actually 
produced the evidence in their Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures. (Record at 395-413, specifically 
405.) Further, even if such newly understood evidence can be considered "new", the fact remains 
that the evidence could have been understood prior to the summary judgment. The Plaintiffs 
failed to establish the elements necessary to warrant a new trial, and therefore, the trial court's 
decision was not in error. 
Defendants ask this Court to award them their costs and attorney's fees for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this s^^> ~ciay of May, 2005. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
Provo, Utah 
April 6, 1973 
Present: Ray E. Gammon, Chairman 
J . Victor Leifson, Board Member 
Robert K. Dusenberry, Board Member 
Q. M. Burdick, Board Member 
Jay H. Bishop, County Building Official 
Margaret G. Agnew, Secretary 
The following cit izens were also present: Lowell W. Carney, Elda Carney, 
Dorothy T. Steele, Harry M. Steele, Naomi Keetch, Fred A. Keetch, 
Fred S. Keetch, Larry R. Will iams, Sherrie Williams, June Dean, Donna 
Hail, Dean Hail, Norman J. Smith, Jessie N. Smith, Jim A. Rigtrup, 
Al G. Rigtrup, Carolyn M. Rigtrup, Olive Haueter, Jay O. Haueter, 
Julia D. Raven, Errol J. Raven, Rodney Raven, Colleen Raven, J. T. Walker, 
James M. Peterson, LaRita Peterson, Sears and Mark Hintze. 
APPEAL NO, Mr. Al G, Rigtrup submitted his application on March 9, 
293 1973, requesting a zone usage variance to his property 
located at 6055 South 3200 West, Utah County, and which 
is situated within the Commercial-1 and Agriculture-1 Zone District . 
He would like to build a new modern hatchery and caretaker 's home in 
the Commercial Zone. He would also like the home to be as close to the 
hatchery as poss ible . The hatchery is a 24 hour job and a home needs to 
be as close as possible to hear the alarms. The hatchery can be built 
in the Commercial Zone, but, according to the Ordinance, the home cannot. 
There is good farm land behind the Commercial Zone which is situated within 
the A-l Zone, but Mr. Rigtrup does not want to waste part of the land to 
build a home, 
There were no objections to the appeal. 
Decision: Mr. Leifson moved that the Board grant Appeal #293 to 
Al G. Rigtrup for a zone usage variance subject to the hatchery and home 
being no closer than 50 ft. from the road. The motion was seconded by 
Mr, Burdick and carried unanimously by the Board. 
APPEAL NO. Norman JI< Smith and Dean B. Hall submitted their applications 
294 & 295 on March 21 , 1973, requesting permission to construct two 
homes on their property located at 5280 and 52 60 North 
Canyon Road. The properties are in the RA-1 Zone District. According to 
the County Zoning Ordinance, a 100 ft. frontage on a state or county or 
federal road must be present before a personal resident building permit 
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^11 be issued. Provo City has a warranty deed for a strip of land which 
is a lso an access road used by many different individuals to a water weir 
house. This strip divides approximately an 800 ft. frontage on North Canyon 
Road which is a State Road, and 18 acres proposed for building. Question 
arises whether the frontage can be applied to the other divided property. 
On the south boundary of the proposed building site is a dirt road which 
connects directly to the state highway and has been used as a right-of-way 
for over twenty years . 
Mr. Jesse Smith presented the Board with a letter written by Provo 
City giving permission for securing an easement. The deeded piece of 
property to Provo City is not recorded as an easement. 
Jesse Smith will deed two parcels of land to his son and son-in- law 
for the homes. 
There were no objections to the appea ls . 
Decision: Mr. Dusenberry moved that AppeSl #2 94"and ^295 to 
Norman J. Smith and Dean B. Hall be granted for a frontage variance subject 
to approval of receiving the Provo City easement and obtaining 100 ffe, 
frontage on the road for each residence. 
APPEAL NO. Larry R. Williams and June T. Dean submitted an application 
296 on March 21 , 1973, requesting a frontage variance to 
the property located at 7290 North 5300 West , in the RA-1 
Zone District . There is 2 50 ft. fronting on an off-ramp to 1-15 but this 
is not an access ib le frontage. Mr. Williams feels that there is a deeded 
right-of-way into the property and he brought papers of the warranty deeds 
back from 1897. The right-of-way is only 2 rods wide (33ft.) This is the 
only acces s to the property. 
Mr. and Mrs. Steele feel that the right-of-way is only a t ra i l . They 
own the land which the disputable right-of-way c rosses . 
The Board decided that the case was prematurely brought before the 
Board. Mr. Dusenberry moved that action on this appeal be tabled until 
the right-of-way dispute is resolved. Mr. Burdick seconded the motion 
and it was unanimously passed by the Board. 
APPEAL NO. Janell Money submitted an application on March 21 , 1973, 
297 requesting permission for a home occupation at 5725 South 
1150 West , in the RA-1 Zone District. She would like 
to have a beauty shop in her home and she will be the only operator. 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
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P O Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone. (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
i \26765-l\initial disclosures 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GASHLER, DEAN HALL, and 
DONNA HALL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT E. PEAY and JANICE P. PEAY, 
Defendants 
PLAINTIFFS' INITIAL DISCLOSURES 
Case No. 020405580 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division #5 
Plaintiffs hereby make initial disclosures as required by Rule 26, U. R. Civ P. 
1 The following witnesses are those presently known to plaintiffs who are believed 
to have discoverable information regarding the events surrounding the events in this lawsuit and 
the damages sustained by the plaintiffs* 
A Dean Hall, 5480 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604 Subject: Will 
testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
B. Donna" Hall, 5480 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 8460?! Subject: Will 
testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
C Robert E. Peay, 5400 North Canyon Road, Provo, Ut§ 
D. Janice P. Peay, 5400 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. Subject: 
E. David Gashler, 692 West 1600 North, Mapleton, Utah 84664. Subject: 
Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
F. Steve White 5490 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. Subject: Will 
testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
G. Sandy White, 5490 North CanyonRoad, Provo, Utah 84604. Subject: Will 
testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
H. Wesley Clay Smith, 5440 North 274 East, Orem, Utah 84057. 801-623-
2126. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
I. Barbara Smith, 866 North 275 East, Orem, Utah 84057. 801-623-2761. 
Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
J. Scott G. Smith, 294 East 4840 South, Provo, Utah. 84604. Subject: Will 
testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
K. Gary and Mini Smith, 5082 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84064. 801-
224-2985 Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
L. Jack and Rebecca Rhodes, 5500 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84064. 
801-224-84$fi. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August 
2002. 
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M. Verl and Aria Smith, 5253 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84064. 801-
225-0431. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002. 
N. Stanley and Jacque Smith, 5068 North Canyon Road, Provo Utah 84064. 
801-225-1629. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 
2002. 
O. Roger and Janie Gillespie, 5013 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. 
801-224-1587. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 
2002. 
P. Russell O. Brown, P.E., RB&G Engineering, Inc., 1435 West 820 North, 
Provo, Utah 84601. 801-374-5771. Subject: See report and letter. 
2. The following documents are potential exhibits at the time of trial: 
A. Report from RB&G Engineering, Inc. dated March 25, 2003. 
B. Letter from RB&G Engineering, Inc. dated March 25, 2003. 
C. Audio Tape of conversation between Mr. Hall and Mr. Peay 
D. Letter from Robert Peay to Scott Smith dated October 10, 2002. 
E. Letter from Robert Peay to Dean and Donna Hall dated January 27, 2003. 
F. Aerial Photographs of the area. 
G. Letter from Scott G. Smith to Robert Peay dated February 7, 2003. 
H. Warranty Deeds dated July 10, 1992, June 12, 1945, April 25, 1973 and 
July 26, 1950. 
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I. Quit Claim Deeds dated July 8, 1929 and what is believed to be dated 
November 10, 2002. 
J. Photographs of the property. 
3. The damages computed at this time are outlined in the complaint filed by the 
Plaintiffs and also include the documents outlined above and attached hereto. Plaintiff is still 
compiling information to finalize the damages associated with this litigation. 
4: Insurance: N/A. 
DATED th i s^L day of July, 2003. \ x 
Phillip Lowry, (for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this _J day oH^y^2003V 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84606 
/r
~^
/lg/ifs?\ (Qrrrr?^^ 
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February 7, 2003 
Dear Bob, 
When I received your letter last fall 1 passed it off as part of your disagreement with Dean and 
Donna, which 1 have chosen to stay entirely out of. 1 was confident, given time, that both parties 
would settle reasonably. It is unfortunate that it has gotten personal. The only part of that letter I 
agreed with was that our families have been good friends through the years. My dad believed, as 
do I, that neighbors talk things out instead of fighting them out. Owing to the good relationship 
you and 1 have always had, 1 thought that you would come to talk to me man-to-man if this was 
serious. 
From the contents of the letter 1 received last week, I can see that you are serious and determined. 
But you are mistaken about some facts. In my copy of the ''Water Line Easement Grant", dated 
June 1977, that you attempted to get my father and mother to sign, you sought to obtain exactly 
what you still need now. I think that you know the reason that Dad refused to sign;it?" The 
language reveals that you knew that we had a right to use the waterline, not only because you 
made an agreement with Dad when it was installed, but because the watferline is located on Smith 
property, which it now has been for thirty years. You wanted, throJgn^hat agreement, to secure 
the same rights that we had, for your successors and assigns. You also needed a maintenance 
easement. You knew that the original verbal agreement was between you and my dad, and didn't 
extend to your successors and assigns. If you needed it then, you need it trow. 
That waterline was relocated and re-engjneered, from Roger's gm§n w4No Trespassing" sign to 
the east border of what is now the deer fence, in 1983 when the Provo City water tank was 
constructed. The city, with the intent to secure stability of the line over time, built the new line, 
which they refer to as the Srnith-Peay water line, out of ductile cast iroir'pipe. This was a 
substantial improvement over plastic pvc pipe. The city replaced and rerouted over half the 
original line. There has been no need for maintenance on the pipe kseslf since it was 
reconstructed. 
In the ten years, from 1973-1983, that the line was in place, you raised no objection to the 
original agreement between you and Dad, The only attempt to reduce anything to writing was 
your request for a waterline agreement in June of 1977. if you'd had any objection when the-eity 
relocated the line, it was not noted in the county Board of Adjustment meeting notes where the 
city agreed to relocate and reconstruct the line. You didn't object then because you were in 
agreement. 
In the letter from your attorney he claims that "liability has been substantially increased because 
of [my] failure to properly maintain a large part" of the distribution system. The system on my 
property has not only been maintained, but substantially improved in the past few years. The 
only time I have had any mishap on my system is when you allowed Jack to split the water turn 
with you. The only time I can recall water flooding anywhere in any major amount is when 
someone turns the valve off coming down to us and fails to open the main valve allowing it to 
ilow south down the Smith Ditch tributary-like when your hired hand did it a couple of years 
back. 
0)1439 
In view of present and future possibilities of property changing ownership, some kind of 
agreement must be reached. The entire pipeline in question is on Donna's, then Wesley's 
property. Since you still don't have an easement or maintenance agreement, the prudent thing to 
do would be to secure them from the property owners instead of taking inflammatory measures 
that will make that impossible. 
This letter is my attempt to resolve this issue without havmg to litigate. If I am short on the facts, 
I would like to be brought up to speed. If you have any desire to work this out without gotng to 
court, please contact me. 
Yott, of all people, understand straight forward language. Understand that this is nothing 
personal. One thing you and 1 have been able to do is speak honestly with each other. Quite 
frankly, 1 have enjoyed that relationship. 1 hope that this situation is a rock in the road that we 
can work around. Recently you have chosen to reduce our relationship to writing, so 1 have 
responded in like manner. If you have any desire to talk m person, I suggest we take a walk up 
on the hill rather than meet at either of our homes. 
Sincerely, 
Scott G. Smith 
033408 
=PE4Y'S SUN CANYON &4NCH— 
5400 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604 801-225-1581 
Jan.27-03 
Att.Dean and Donna Hall 
I l e f t a message on your phone concerning your son Timmy shooting quail 
and other wild l i f e birds on your property out of season. Just because 
these w i ld l i fe birds are on your property does not give him or anyone else 
the r ight to shoot them out of season. I have recived this knowlodc$- from a 
very close source to your family, and as 1 put out large feeders in my back 
yard to help the quail Phesants and turkeys thru the winter I guess that is 
why we'have fa i led to see any birds useing them. Please see that this is 
stopped immediately as i f I hear any more shooting or recive any more 
information from my source I w i l l call the Fish and Game Dept. and have them 
investigate. 
sn0437 
PEAY'S Construction & Rentals 
585 East 300 South 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
Phone 801 3 74-9200 CRAIG PEAY 
Vice President 
Oct. 10, 02 
Scott Smith 
294 East 4840 North 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Dear Scott: 
This le t ter is concerning'my irrigation p?pe, which I have given 
you permission to use to transport irrigation water to your property 
which is North of my property. 
Just so that there is ao Mi sunder standing, I w&ht you to know that there 
is No Permanent Easement of any kind granted to you with my permission, 
to use the pipe line. He are such good friends I just diden't want to have 
any disagrement with you in the futher concerning your use of my water pipe. 
BOBPEAY 
President 
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WITNESS THE HAND _ 
J u l y . , 
> of said Grantor. 
A.D. 1 9 3 1 
-/daS#>f 
ned in the-presence of 
VJame M. G i x l e s p i e ^ 
STATE OF LPTAH, 
County of U t a b 
Qn the day of J U 1 Y . A. D. 19 ? 2 . , personally appeared 
before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Utah Roger S. G i l l e s p i e , . 
and Janie H. G i l l e s p l 
x - • • • • « . . . _A4 l i b 
the signer^_of the above insirument, who duly acknowledged to me that_tJiey_ execvteji;the^aTOe. ^-Jtfk\ 
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